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Abstract 
 
Various theories of religion hypothesize a connection between death anxiety 
and religiosity. In particular, Terror Management Theory’s worldview 
defense hypothesis predicts that death anxiety is lowest among very religious 
and irreligious individuals, and highest among uncertain individuals. 
Likewise, the supposition that death anxiety motivates religious belief, which 
in turn mitigates death anxiety predicts that religiosity increases with death 
anxiety among nonbelievers, and that death anxiety decreases as religiosity 
increases among believers. In both cases, a curvilinear relationship—
specifically, an inverted-U curve—is predicted. We extracted 202 effect sizes 
from 100 studies for an “omnibus” religiosity meta-analysis, and six meta-
analyses that examine particular dimensions of religiosity. We found high 
heterogeneity and a weak negative association between death anxiety and 
religiosity. A closer examination revealed that 10 of the 11 studies that 
directly tested for curvilinearity provided some support for an inverted-U 
pattern. The curvilinearity hypothesis cannot be ruled out, but more 
evidence—particularly on nonreligious individuals, and in nonwestern, 
nonAbrahamic contexts—is needed. 
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 A brief history of thanatocentric theories of religion 
The notion that religious belief is motivated by fear has a long and venerable 
history. Even from classical times, philosophers have made this link, as 
Petronius’s oft-quoted line—primus in orbe deos fecit timor—indicates: it was 
fear that first made gods in the world. In perhaps the earliest systematic 
naturalistic account of religion, Lucretius Carus (c. 99 BCE–c. 55 BCE) 
proposed that the uncertainties and perils of mortal life lead us to believe that 
gods control the natural world; he did not, however, suppose that the belief in 
gods was comforting. To the contrary, Lucretius argued that ideas about 
divine wrath and postmortem judgement increase fear, including the fear of 
death. Much later, the British anthropologist Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1939) 
would revisit this line of argument, specifically in the context of religious and 
magical rituals. Prescriptions about ritual performance, he argued, generate 
fear based on the potential for failure to perform the rite appropriately. 
However, for most of Western intellectual history, the proposed relationship 
between religion and fear—and the fear of death in particular—has been 
characterized by two causal claims: first, that fear motivates religious belief, 
and second, that religious belief mitigates fear.  
 The fear of death has repeatedly featured in theorizing about the 
evolutionary and psychological origins of religion in precisely these terms. 
David Hume (1757/2008, p. 140), for example, hypothesized that it is “the 
ordinary affections of human life; the anxious concern for happiness, the 
dread of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst of revenge, the appetite for 
food and other necessaries” (emphasis added) that led our ancestors to see 
“the first obscure traces of divinity”. Similarly, Ludwig Feuerbach (1851/1967) 
proposed that religion arises out of our feelings of finitude, the chief source of 
which is the knowledge of our mortality, so much so that, “If man did not die, 
if he lived forever, if there were no such thing as death, there would be no 
religion” (p. 33). This focus on death sharpens further in the 20th century, 
particularly in the work of the anthropologists Bronislaw Malinowski and 
Ernest Becker, and more recently in social psychological research on Terror 
Management Theory. 
 For both Malinowski and Becker, the fear of death is a given, a 
psychobiological endowment from our evolutionary past: the fear of death is 
the affective complement to the desire for self-preservation. Having asserted 
that the fear of death is the “result of some deep-seated instincts common to 
man and animals” (Malinowski, 1948, p. 50), theorists have also maintained 
that human beings’ existential anxieties are unique to the extent that we are 
self-aware, and therefore also aware that death may be the end of our selves. 
Consequently, it is specifically the fear of annihilation—that is, of the cessation 
of life, conscious experiences, and personhood—that occupies Malinowski 
(e.g., 1948, p. 50), Becker (e.g., 1973, p. 66), and their intellectual descendants, 
rather than fears that we might share with nonhuman animals, such as 
aversions to pain. This fear of annihilation is, for Malinowski (1948, p. 47), 
religion’s most powerful driver: thus, “Of all sources of religion”, he writes, 
“the supreme and final crisis of life—death—is of the greatest importance”. 
Becker (1973, p. 27) takes it further still, extending the theory to cover all of 
human cultural achievements, such that everything human beings do in our 
“symbolic world is an attempt to deny and overcome [our] grotesque fate”. 
This is not to deny that Becker prioritizes religion; indeed, religion is, to 
Becker, “the ‘best’ illusion under which to live” (1973, p. 202), and all other 
cultural “immortality projects” (e.g., nationalism, ethnocentrism, artistic and 
scientific endeavor) are functional facsimiles of belief systems that offer literal 
immortality.   
 
Terror Management Theory 
Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) 
adopts Becker’s theory of culture more generally, and of religion in particular, 
extracting its core insights from their original psychoanalytic context and 
reinterpreting them in terms of evolutionary and social psychological 
theories. Like Becker, TMT also begins with the observation that human 
beings are, perhaps uniquely, aware of their mortality. This self-awareness 
elicits crippling existential anxiety, which in turn motivates us to seek 
immortality, whether literal or symbolic. Literal immortality is pursued 
through afterlife concepts (e.g., immortal souls, heaven, reincarnation, 
nirvana), whereas symbolic immortality is pursued through lasting culturally 
valued identifications and achievements, and the increased self-esteem they 
engender (Dechesne et al. 2003). Religious worldviews, at least those with 
comforting afterlife beliefs, offer both literal (via afterlife concepts) and 
symbolic immortality (via membership in durable religious organizations, 
notions of chosenness and cosmic significance, etc.), and are therefore the 
culturally dominant means of relieving existential anxiety: as Vail et al. (2010, 
p. 65) claim, “there may be no antidote to the human fear of death quite like 
religion”.   
 This distinction between literal and symbolic immortality raises the 
possibility of a tension within Terror Management Theory. According to the 
standard worldview defense account of terror management, it is the bolstering 
of our worldviews—regardless of content—that mitigates death anxiety; we 
are therefore motivated to defend our worldviews against the worldviews of 
others. There is an impressive amount of evidence for this account, as recently 
reported in a meta-analysis by Burke, Martens, and Faucher’s (2010), 
reminders of death consistently lead individuals to enhance their self-esteem, 
defend their cultural values, favour their ingroups (including minimal 
ingroups; Harmon-Jones, Greenberg, Solomon, & Simon, 1996), and denigrate 
outgroups. Note that on this view, even atheism might serve the same terror 
management function as religion more traditionally construed, insofar as 
atheism represents a worldview to be defended; furthermore, there seems to 
be no reason to doubt this, given that even worldview defense effects can 
occur in minimal group contexts (Heflick & Goldenberg, 2012; but see 
Laundau, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2004). Nevertheless, some recent research 
suggests that the motivation to pursue literal immortality may take priority 
over the desire to defend our preexisting and culturally dominant beliefs. For 
example, Norenzayan and Hansen (2006) found that Christians were more 
willing to endorse belief in culturally unfamiliar gods when they were 
reminded of death (but see Vail, Arndt, & Abdollahi, 2012). And recent 
evidence suggests that even atheists benefit from afterlife beliefs (Heflick & 
Goldenberg, 2012).  
 
Predictions from thanatocentric theories 
As we have discussed, thanatocentric theories of religion tend to comprise 
two causal claims about the relationship between religiosity and the fear of 
death. First, there is the claim that death anxiety motivates religious belief. 
This might lead us to expect that more death anxious individuals are also 
more attracted to religion than their stoical peers: a positive correlation 
between death anxiety and religious belief. Second, there is the claim that 
religious belief mitigates death anxiety. These claims might lead one to 
predict that more religious individuals enjoy reduced levels of anxiety than 
their secular peers: a negative correlation between death anxiety and religious 
belief. We seem to have a contradiction on our hands. The contradiction is 
resolved, however, when we see the two hypotheses as occupying different 
halves of an inverted U-shaped curve (see Figure 1). That is, among religious 
nonbelievers, those who are more afraid of death are more tempted toward 
religion, whereas among believers, those who are more certain in their 
conviction enjoy the fruits of their faith, which is the dissipation of their 
existential fears. Thus, the two thanatocentric hypotheses combine to predict a 
curvilinear (viz., negative quadratic) relationship between death anxiety and 
religious belief. 
 
[Figure 1] 
Figure 1. Predicted inverted U-shaped curve. 
 
A curvilinear relationship is also consistent with Terror Management 
Theory’s worldview defense account. Recall that on this view both religious 
and atheistic worldviews may serve to mitigate death anxiety. We might 
therefore expect—all things being equal—that people with neither religious 
nor antireligious commitments will experience high levels of death anxiety 
compared to those who either hold a strongly religious or strongly atheistic 
worldview. This is clearly a different causal account to the one described 
above; nevertheless, both accounts make the same prediction about the 
relationship between death anxiety and religiosity: an inverted-U curve. 
Correlational studies therefore cannot resolve this dispute between different 
thanatocentric accounts; conversely, a failure to find the hypothesized 
curvilinear relationship would provide a serious challenge to both.  
  
Previous reviews: fear(s) of death and religiosity 
There is, as we shall see, a plethora of empirical studies designed to show 
how death anxiety and religiosity are related. Two previous attempts to 
survey this literature are particularly instructive.  
 First, Donovan’s (1994) survey of 137 studies found that 78 provided 
evidence for a negative relationship between death anxiety and religiosity, 
whereas 13 provided evidence for a positive relationship, and the remaining 
46 presented contradictory, null, or otherwise inconclusive findings. Among 
these 46, there were also six studies that supported the curvilinearity 
hypothesis, suggesting that the relationship between death anxiety and 
religiosity forms an inverted-U pattern. Donovan argues that his survey 
provides tentative support for the curvilinearity hypothesis despite the 
paucity of direct evidence to the effect. To explain the apparent contradiction 
between studies that found positive and negative correlations, he conjectured 
that an important factor is differences in the religiosity of the samples: highly 
religious samples are likely to produce negative correlations, whereas highly 
nonreligious samples are likely to produce positive correlations. Similarly, to 
explain the null effects, he argued that this is consistent with an untested 
negative quadratic relationship: in a mixed sample, positive and negative 
linear relationships among nonreligious and religious participants 
respectively could cancel each other out. These conjectures enjoy a prima facie 
plausibility, but Donovan (1994) made little attempt to test them.  
 The second, more recent survey, by Ellis and Wahab (2013) did 
quantify the effects of various sampling and methodological factors, but its 
scope was somewhat narrower. They reviewed 84 papers, from which they 
extracted 108 effects. Of these, 40 showed a negative correlation between 
death anxiety and religiosity, 27 showed a positive correlation, and 32 
showed no significant correlation in either direction, and nine provided 
support for the curvilinearity  hypothesis. In addition, they examined 
whether other sample characteristics— such as age, gender, and religiosity—
could help to explain the diverse results. While most of these analyses found 
null effects, there was some evidence that the negative correlations were 
driven by samples that skewed religious: 42% of the studies that found a 
negative correlation included only individuals who were moderately and 
strongly religious. Thus, like Donovan (1994), Ellis and Wahab (2013) 
concluded that “when nonreligious individuals are sampled alongside those 
who are both moderately and extremely religious, the overall relationship 
shifts to being curvilinear, and possibly even positive” (p. 149).  
 These two reviews provide the starting point for the present attempt to 
systematically survey existing evidence for thanatocentric hypotheses. 
Nevertheless, we believe that both reviews assumed too broad a definition of 
“death anxiety”, including different kinds of death-related attitudes (e.g., 
positive vs. negative attitudes) and emotions (e.g., depression). Furthermore, 
Donovan (1994) also conflated different measures of religiosity under the 
questionable assumption that they measure the same underlying constructs. 
Both reviews reported significant heterogeneity in findings, which they 
attribute largely to sampling biases, but another possibility is that conflating 
different kinds of measures exacerbated the problem. Consequently, one of 
our key goals was to take a more targeted approach; we define dimensions of 
religiosity more precisely, both for theoretical reasons, and in an effort to 
reduce the heterogeneity encountered in previous reviews.  
  
“Death anxiety” and “religious belief” 
As we alluded to above, thanatocentric theories of religion are primarily 
concerned with the fear of one’s own death. This may be distinguished from 
the fear of the dying process (e.g., the pain involved), and the fear of others’ 
death and dying (Collett & Lester, 1969; Lester, 1990; Wittkowski, 2001). More 
specifically, following our reading of Malinowski (1948) and Becker (1973), 
our specific construct of concern is existential death anxiety, the fear of the 
“complete cessation” of life (e.g., Malinowski, 1948, p. 50) and of the 
“annihilation” of the self (or the “ego”; e.g., Becker, 1973, p. 288). This may be 
distinguished from other aspects of our own death that are potentially anxiety 
inducing, such as fears concerning loved ones left behind, or about the fate of 
our bodies and belongings.  
 These distinctions are important given the diversity of ways in which 
fears and anxieties about death have been measured. By far the most common 
measure of death anxiety is Templer’s (1970) Death Anxiety Scale (DAS; see 
also revisions of the DAS, Templer et al., 2006; Thorson & Powell, 1992), 
which conflates various aspects of fear of death and dying, containing both 
general items about being “afraid to die” and also specific items about “a 
painful death” and even heart attacks, cancer, World War III, and corpses. 
The DAS is usually treated as a unidimensional measure of general death 
anxiety, but multiple factor analyses have shown that its underlying structure 
is multidimensional (e.g., Durlak, 1982; Gilliland & Templer, 1985; Levin, 
1990; Lonetto, Fleming, & Mercer, 1979; Martin, 1982; Royal & Elahi, 2011; 
Tomás-Sábado & Gómez-Benito, 2002).  
 More recently, however, there has been increasing recognition of the 
multidimensionality of death anxiety. Consequently, there are now various 
multidimensional scales, the most widely using being the Collett-Lester Fear 
of Death Scale (FOD; Lester, 1990), Hoelter’s Multidimensional Fear of Death 
Scale (MFODS; Hoelter, 1979), and Florian and Kravetz’s (1983) Fear of 
Personal Death Scale (FPODS). Each of these scales consists of multiple 
subscales that are intended to capture particular dimensions of death anxiety. 
The Collett-Lester FOD distinguishes the fear of death from the fear of dying, 
and fears concerning oneself from fears concerning others. MFODS comprises 
eight subscales—the fear of the dying process, of the dead, of being 
destroyed, for significant others, of the unknown, of conscious death, for the 
body after death, and of premature death—none of which appear to capture 
the fear of annihilation as described above. The fear of the unknown comes 
closest, but may be confounded with religiosity, as it contains items about 
afterlife and God beliefs. FOPDS comprises six subscales—the fear of the loss 
of self-fulfilment, of the loss of social identity, of consequences to family and 
friends, of transcendental consequences, of punishment in the hereafter, and 
of self-annihilation—the last of which enjoys face validity as a measure of our 
construct of interest.   
 Measures of death anxiety are diverse: different scales and subscales 
measure different aspects of death anxiety, not all of which are theoretically 
relevant for our purposes. There is an analogous problem in the measurement 
of religiosity. Following most thanatocentric theorists of religion, our primary 
interest is in religious belief: the belief in supernatural agents, particularly 
those relevant to the afterlife. However, many studies employ “hodgepodge” 
measures of religiosity that conflate various kinds of religious attitudes and 
behaviours (Gorsuch, 1984, p. 234). Furthermore, among the most common 
religiosity measures are measures of religious orientation, of the manner in 
which an individual approaches religion. Measures of religious orientation 
are not very useful for evaluating thanatocentric theories of religion, as such 
theories do not generate hypotheses about religious orientation. Nevertheless, 
some measures of religious orientation may plausibly be used as proxies for 
an individual’s commitment to her religious worldview.   
  Given the diversity in the measurement of death- and religiosity-
related constructs, it is perhaps unsurprising that previous reviews have 
found such heterogeneous associations. In an attempt to reduce this 
heterogeneity, we restricted our systematic review and meta-analysis to a 
narrower range of measures, and, following Ellis and Wahab (2013), made 
distinctions between categories of measures where possible (see Method 
below). Like Ellis and Wahab (2013), we conducted a systematic review of the 
literature, but we also supplemented this with estimates of aggregate effect 
sizes for each category of religiosity measures.  
 
Method 
Search and Selection  
To ensure as exhaustive a collection as possible, we searched for potentially 
relevant research articles in multiple databases, using the following Boolean 
search phrase: “("death anxiety" OR "fear of death" OR "fear of dying" OR 
"death fear" OR "attitudes towards death" OR "attitudes to death") AND 
("religiosity" OR "religion" OR "faith" OR "spirituality" OR "spiritual" OR 
“afterlife”)”. This search was first conducted in Google Scholar, EBSCOhost, 
and ProQuest, and then also in two specific journals—Omega: Journal of Death 
and Dying, and Death Studies (where many relevant articles were found, based 
on our database search).  
 Our searches produced 464 initial hits. We rejected 322 of these from 
further consideration because their abstracts suggested that they did not 
measure either religiosity or death anxiety. For the remaining 142 articles, the 
methods and results sections were consulted to ascertain whether the 
measures used were relevant, and whether the relevant statistics were 
reported. Articles were retained if they met all four of the following criteria: 
(1) they measured the fear of one’s own death or dying (as opposed to the fear 
of others’ death; or other death-related constructs, such as obsession and 
depression; Abdel-Khalek, 1998; Templer, Lavoie, Chalgujian, & Thomas-
Dobson, 1990); (2) they measured aspects of religiosity, including religious 
beliefs, behaviour, identity, and/or orientation; (3) they examined the 
relationship between death anxiety and religiosity; and (4) they reported 
effects from which correlation coefficients can be estimated.   
 Based on these criteria, 100 articles were included in our quantitative 
analyses. Twenty-five further articles fulfilled all but the final criterion (i.e., 
adequate information for effect size estimation)1. Of the 100 articles, 92 tested 
linear relationships, or otherwise made categorical comparisons between 
more and less religious groups. Very few studies sampled sufficient numbers 
of nonreligious participants to enable the curvilinearity hypothesis to be 
                                                
1 Further information about all 125 articles are included in Supplementary Materials. 
tested2. Recall that the curvilinearity hypothesis encompasses both religious 
and nonreligious individuals: a positive correlation between death anxiety 
and religiosity is expected among nonreligious individuals, whereas a 
negative correlation is expected among religious individuals. Thanatocentric 
theories differ on their causal account of this pattern, but agree on the shape 
of the pattern itself. However, insofar as very few existing studies sample 
sufficient numbers of nonreligious individuals, they are unable to test the 
curvilinearity hypothesis at all. In this case, thanatocentric theories would 
simply predict a negative linear effect, consistent with the notion that 
religiosity mitigates death anxiety among religious individuals. Thus, we 
estimated linear effects in our meta-analyses; in addition, we paid special 
attention to those studies that tested for curvilinearity. Finally, as Ellis and 
Wahab (2013) have also observed, the likelihood of finding a negative 
quadratic pattern should increase as the proportion of nonreligious 
participants in a sample increases; as nonreligious participants outnumber 
religious participants, we might even expect a shift toward a positive 
correlation. We therefore also estimated whether the percent of participants 
who were nonreligious predicted effect sizes.  
  
                                                
2 Of the 100 studies, only 72 reported enough information to ascertain the proportion 
of nonreligious participants. 24.5% of these had no nonreligious participants at all; 
56.9% had samples that consisted of 10% or fewer nonreligious participants. The 
mean proportion of nonreligious participants per sample was 12.87% (SD = 16.61). 
Effect size selection and conversion 
From the 100 studies, it was possible to extract 272 effect sizes, as many 
studies used multiple measures of death anxiety and religiosity. We reduced 
the number of effect sizes to 202 by selecting only the most relevant measure 
of death anxiety for each sample, and the most relevant measure of religiosity 
for each religiosity category for each sample. In keeping with our theoretical 
concerns and our reading of thanatocentric theories, our primary construct of 
interest was the fear of one’s own death, as distinct from the fear of dying, 
and the fear of others’ death and dying (Collett & Lester, 1969). In particular, 
we were most interested in the fear of the cessation of life or the extinction of 
the self, as distinct from other aspects of death. Thus, in selecting death 
anxiety measures, we prioritized measures of the fear of personal annihilation 
or extinction (e.g., FPODS “fear of personal annihilation” subscale; MFODS 
“fear of the unknown” subscale), followed by more general measures of the 
fear of one’s own death (e.g., Collett-Lester “fear of death”). Finally, we also 
retained general measures of death anxiety, such as Templer’s DAS, if neither 
of the previous two kinds of measures were used. Although such measures 
do not specifically target our construct, we assume that they serve as 
adequate proxies. Supporting our assumption, previous research has shown 
Templer’s DAS scores to be highly correlated with the Collett-Lester “fear of 
death of self” subscale, relative to its other subscales (Abdel-Khalek, 2002; 
Lester, 1990). Other general measures, many of which derived from DAS, 
were retained when a more specific measure was not available (e.g., Conte, 
Weiner, & Plutchik, 1982; Templer et al., 2006; Thorson & Powell, 1992).  
 There was much less redundancy among religiosity measures, 
especially after they were categorized into four groups: general/composite 
measures of religiosity, measures of religious belief, measures of religious 
behaviour, measures of religious orientation. As we were most interested in 
religious belief, whenever multiple measures of each type were used in a 
sample, we retained the measure that we felt was most indicative of religious 
belief (e.g., private religious behaviours were preferred over public ones)3.  
Most studies reported the association between death anxiety and 
religiosity as a Person correlation coefficient (r). When other measures of the 
association were reported (e.g., mean differences, t-test, odds ratio, χ2, etc.) we 
transformed them to r (see Card, 2011; Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000). If 
only the significance level of an r, t, or F statistic was reported, we estimated 
the effect size by assigning the minimum r that would provide that level of 
significance given the sample size; if the effect size was reported as not 
significant or p > .05, r was estimated as 0 (Card, 2011).  
 
[Figure 2] 
Figure 2. PRISMA flow diagram. 
 
                                                
3 The effects that were dropped are reported in Supplementary Materials. 
Summary of Meta-analysis 
We first performed an “omnibus analysis” in which all religiosity effect sizes 
were pooled together across religiosity categories; this analysis provides the 
broadest overview of the available research findings. In addition, because 
different dimensions of religiosity might show different associations with 
death anxiety, we also performed a series of meta-analyses that examined the 
four categories independently: general/composite measures of religiosity, 
measures of religious belief, measures of religious behaviour, and measures of 
religious orientation. 
 For each meta-analysis, we converted r scores into Fisher’s z-scores to 
estimate uncertainty in effect sizes, and back-transformed Fisher’s z-scores to 
r scores for interpretation (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). The meta-analyses were 
conducted using the R package Metafor using a random-effects model with 
the restricted maximum-likelihood estimator of heterogeneity and the Knapp 
and Hartung adjustment (Team, 2013; Viechtbauer, 2010). To index 
heterogeneity we used Q statistics (Cochran, 1954) and I2 indices (Higgins, 
Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003). To examine potential moderators of 
effect sizes (percent non-religious, percent female, and mean age), we used 
random-effects meta-regression. We used funnel plots to examine the 
evidence for publication bias. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary Overview and Omnibus Meta-analysis 
An initial view of the 202 results presents a chaotic picture. By far the most 
common result—accounting for more than half the effects (n = 106)—is a null 
finding: that is, no significant linear effect in either direction. The next most 
common finding (n = 60) was a negative correlation between religiosity and 
death anxiety; the remaining 36 effects were positive correlations. Thus, as 
did Donovan (1994) and Ellis and Wahab (2013), we see that existing findings 
are very heterogeneous. 
 Before conducting an omnibus meta-analysis, we eliminated 
nonindependent observations by calculating an average effect size whenever 
multiple effect sizes were reported for any sample (i.e., multiple measures of 
religiosity). The omnibus meta-analysis of all 113 effect sizes showed high 
heterogeneity, Q(112) = 801.12, p < .01; I2 = 83.66%. The average association 
between death anxiety and omnibus religiosity was r = −.06 (95% CI [−.09, 
−.02], p < .01), providing evidence for a small negative association (see 
Supplementary Materials for forest plots of all meta-analyses). The proportion 
of nonreligious participants (% nonreligious) was available for 80 effect sizes. 
Across these 80 effect sizes, associations between death anxiety and religiosity 
were not found to be moderated by % nonreligious, F(1, 78) = 2.17, p = .15. The 
high heterogeneity compromises the meaningfulness of this estimate, so the 
precise magnitude of the overall effect size should be interpreted with 
considerable caution. In fact, given the diversity of measures of religiosity in 
this omnibus meta-analysis this high level of heterogeneity is not unexpected.  
 In the remainder of this section of the paper, we report the results of 
meta-analyses performed separately for different categories of religious 
measures. A summary of the findings may be found in Table 1 below. 
 
General measures of religiosity 
There were 42 general measures of religiosity effect sizes. Of these, 26 showed 
no statistically significant linear relationship between death anxiety and 
religiosity; 11 showed a negative relationship; and 5 showed a positive 
relationship. As before, the meta-analysis of 42 general religiosity effect sizes 
showed high heterogeneity, Q(41) = 352.90, p < .01; I2 = 85.50%. The average 
association between death anxiety and general religiosity was r = −.05 (95% CI 
[−.10, .00], p = .07), providing no evidence for an association. Across the 30 
effect sizes that included % non-religious, associations were not found to be 
moderated by % nonreligious, F(1, 28) = .15, p = .70.  
 As discussed earlier, such “hodgepodge” measures of religiosity either 
conflate multiple aspects of religiosity together, or attempt to approximate 
“general religiosity” via single broad items. Such attempts problematically 
assume a monolithic view of religiosity, rather than fractionating this complex 
phenomenon into distinct variables of interest. Our primary variable of 
interest is religious belief—the belief in supernatural entities, including those 
that enable literal immortality—and these general/composite measures were 
intended to serve as proxies for religious belief. Fortunately, many of the 
studies we found included more direct measures of religious belief. 
 
Measures of religious belief 
There were 73 religious belief effect sizes. Of these, 43 showed no statistically 
significant relationship with death anxiety; 23 showed a negative relationship; 
and 7 showed a positive relationship.  
 Some studies reported correlations for multiple distinct measures of 
religious belief (e.g., belief in God, belief in afterlife). For these studies, we 
computed mean religious belief scores before running a meta-analysis. This 
meta-analysis of 59 religious belief effect sizes showed high heterogeneity, 
Q(58) = 474.44, p < .01; I2 = 82.19%. The average association between death 
anxiety and religious belief was r = −.07 (95% CI [−.11, −.03], p < .01), providing 
evidence for a small negative association. Across the 38 effect sizes that 
included % non-religious, associations were moderated by % nonreligious, 
F(1, 36) = 4.82, p = .03. However, this association must be interpreted with 
some caution due to the existence of an outlier.4  
 Next, we ran a meta-analysis that focused exclusively on afterlife 
beliefs. In this case, whenever multiple religious belief measures were used in 
the same sample, instead of averaging effect sizes, we retained only the 
                                                
4 The association is not statistically significant when the two data points from the 
study that included this influential case are removed, F(1, 34) = .43, p = .52. 
afterlife belief measures. This meta-analysis of 35 afterlife belief effect sizes 
showed high heterogeneity, Q(33) = 248.54, p < .01; I2 = 79.44%. The average 
association between death anxiety and afterlife beliefs was r = −.06 (95% CI 
[−.11, −.01], p = .03), providing evidence for a small negative association. 
Across the 24 effect sizes that included % non-religious, associations were not 
found to be moderated by % nonreligious, F(1, 2) = .02, p = .89. 
 
Measures of religious behaviour 
As religious belief is often highly correlated with religious behaviour, we also 
looked at the correlation between religious behaviour and death anxiety 
separately, to see if the results are consistent with those on religious belief. 
There were 30 effects on measures of religious behaviour. Of these, 12 showed 
no statistically significant relationship between death anxiety and religiosity; 
11 showed a negative relationship5; and 7 showed a positive relationship. 
 This meta-analysis of 30 religious behaviour effect sizes showed high 
heterogeneity, Q(29) = 414.37, p < .01; I2 = 91.72%. The average association 
between death anxiety and religious behaviour was r = −.08 (95% CI [−.15, 
−.01], p = .03), providing evidence for a small negative association. Across the 
22 effect sizes that included % non-religious, these associations were not 
                                                
5 Two effects were reported as significant in the original papers, but were 
marginally- and nonsignificant once linear contrasts were calculated and 
transformed into r scores. We categorized these effects based on our transformation: 
the marginal effect was retained as negative, while the nonsignificant effect was 
treated as null.  
found to be moderated by % nonreligious, F(1, 20) = 2.36, p = .14. 
 
Measures of religious orientation 
Finally, we turn to religious orientation. There were 57 religious orientation 
effect sizes. Of these, 25 showed no statistically significant relationship; while 
16 showed a negative relationship, and 16 a positive relationship. As 50 of the 
57 effect sizes involved either measures of intrinsic motivation or extrinsic 
motivation, we focused on these two constructs in our meta-analyses6.  
  Researchers have tended to emphasize the positive effects of intrinsic 
religiosity and the negative effects of extrinsic religiosity: indeed, as 
Kirkpatrick and Hood (1990) have observed, intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity 
has typically be treated as “good” and “bad” forms of religiosity respectively. 
Even Gordon Allport (e.g., 1950) himself, to whom the distinction is 
attributed, referred to them as mature and immature religiosity. According to 
Allport and Ross (1967, p. 434), the extrinsically religious individual “uses his 
religion”, whereas the intrinsically religious individual “lives [it]”. That is, the 
extrinsic orientation is a disposition to “use religion for [one’s] own ends”; 
religious beliefs are thus “lightly held or else selectively shaped” in an 
“instrumental and utilitarian” fashion. In contrast, the intrinsic orientation is 
                                                
6 The remaining seven effects, reported across five studies, measured quest (n = 2) 
and fundamentalist (n = 5) religiosity. One study found a positive correlation 
between quest and death anxiety, whereas the other found no association. One study 
found three positive effects across three samples between fundamentalism and death 
anxiety; another two studies found no association. 
a disposition to treat one’s religion as ultimate, with all other concerns 
deprioritized; religious belief is embraced, and the individual “endeavours to 
internalize it and follow it fully”. Thus, intrinsic religiosity has also been 
construed as “true belief”, whereas extrinsic religiosity has been thought of as 
disingenuous participation on religion (e.g., Carroll, 2010; Cicirelli, 2002; 
Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010). Consistent with this “good-religion-versus-bad-
religion” view (Kirkpatrick & Hood, 1990, p. 442), intrinsic religiosity has also 
previously been empirically associated with psychological well-being (Ventis, 
1995), meaning in life (e.g., Donahue, 1985), and even recovery from illness 
(Koenig, George, & Peterson, 1998), whereas such benefits are generally found 
to be unrelated to extrinsic religiosity, which instead predicts negative 
outcomes such as poorer mental health (Ryan, Rigby, & King, 1993) and racial 
prejudice (Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010). Given the values attached to intrinsic 
and extrinsic religiosity in previous research, we might be led to expect that 
intrinsic religiosity is negatively correlated with death anxiety, while extrinsic 
religiosity is positively correlated with death anxiety. Our findings find some 
support for this hypothesis. Of the 30 effect sizes reported on intrinsic 
religiosity, 15 were negative, while the remaining 15 were nonsignificant. 
Similarly, of the 20 effect sizes reported on extrinsic religiosity, 13 were 
positive, while the remaining 7 were nonsignificant.  
 The meta-analysis of 30 intrinsic religiosity effect sizes showed high 
heterogeneity, Q(29) = 206.92, p <.01; I2 = 85.15%. The average association 
between death anxiety and intrinsic religiosity was r = −.21 (95% CI [−.29, 
−.13]), p < .01), providing evidence for a small to medium negative association. 
Across the 26 effect sizes that included % nonreligious, this effect was not 
found to be moderated by % nonreligious, F(1, 24) = .59, p = .45.  
 The meta-analysis of 20 extrinsic religiosity effect sizes showed high 
heterogeneity, Q(19) = 107.28, p < .01; I2 = 82.02%. The average association 
between death anxiety and extrinsic religiosity was r = .27 (95% CI [.18, .35], p 
< .01), providing evidence for a small to medium positive association. Across 
the 18 effect sizes that included % nonreligious, this effect was not found to be 
moderated by % nonreligious, F(1, 16) = 1.20, p = .29.  
 For both intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity, the aggregated associations 
were, on average, larger than for the other measures of religiosity. This is not 
only consistent with the “good-religion-versus-bad-religion” view mentioned 
earlier, but also with a curvilinear effect of religious belief on death anxiety, 
on the assumption that intrinsic religiosity represents a stronger or more 
authentic form of religious commitment (e.g., Carroll, 2010; Sedikides & 
Gebauer, 2010; see also Wink & Scott, 2005), at least for religious participants 
about whom it makes sense to talk about religious orientation at all. 
 
Table 1 
Summary of meta-analysis results 
Category n.s. 
negativ
e 
positiv
e r 95% CI I2 
General measures 26 11 5 −.05 −.10, .00 85.50% 
Religious belief 43 23 7 −.07 
−.11, 
−.03 82.19% 
Afterlife belief* 23 10 2 −.06 
−.11, 
−.01 79.44% 
Religious behaviour 12 11 7 −.08 
−.15, 
−.01 91.72% 
Intrinsic religiosity 15 15 0 −.21 
−.29, 
−.13 85.15% 
Extrinsic religiosity 7 0 13 0.27 .18, .35 82.02% 
*Afterlife belief measures form a proper subset of measures of religious belief 
  
Publication bias 
The funnel plot for the omnibus analysis appears to be relatively symmetric 
(see Supplementary Materials) and Egger’s regression test for funnel plot 
asymmetry was not statistically significant (t = -1.3, p = .20), which suggests 
that publication bias has had little influence on the meta-analysis. Although 
we have not found evidence for publication bias, absence of evidence should 
be interpreted with some caution. First, even when publication bias is present 
it can be difficult to identify (Sterne et al., 2011; Terrin, Schmid, & Lau, 2005). 
Second, given that different research groups makes different predictions 
about associations (i.e. negative, positive, or curvilinear) it is possible that 
results that did not support hypotheses were not reported, and these 
suppressed results “average out”, resulting in a relatively symmetrical funnel 
plot. 
 
A curvilinear relationship? 
Prima facie, the general picture seems like bad news for thanatocentric 
accounts of religion, including the worldview defense account of terror 
management. Recall that these theories predict a curvilinear relationship 
between death anxiety and religiosity, which should manifest as a negative 
linear correlation in samples that are predominantly religious. Our review 
and meta-analyses thus far has provided little evidence for this. First, 
although estimated aggregated effect sizes are generally negative, which is 
consistent with the curvilinearity hypothesis (because most studies were run 
on predominantly religious samples), these effects were also very small. 
Second, there seems to be little consistency across studies: for most religiosity 
constructs, there were studies that found positive, negative, and null 
associations. This observation of heterogeneity is further supported by Q and 
I2 statistics. Third, more than half of the effect sizes reported indicated no 
linear association between religiosity and death anxiety; even in the case of 
our religiosity construct of primary interest, 62.67% of the effects showed no 
association. Finally, concerning the curvilinearity hypothesis more 
specifically, there was little evidence that the proportion of nonreligious 
participants in the sample affected the associations. The only exception to this 
was in the relationship between death anxiety and religious belief. However, 
this result was driven by Jong, Bluemke, and Halberstadt’s (2013) study that 
had the highly unusual property of sampling equal numbers of religious and 
nonreligious participants, and reported effect sizes for them separately as 
separate groups. Indeed, in having a 100% nonreligious sample, Jong et al.’s 
(2013) study was the only one to report a sample with % nonreligious figures 
above 50%. This is not to suggest that the association between % nonreligious 
and death anxiety is a statistical artifact. Rather, there is insufficient evidence 
draw firm conclusions. This result highlights the importance of reporting raw 
data in psychology research. Had earlier studies reported raw data then we 
could have split groups ourselves into religious and nonreligious subgroups 
to test the curvilinear hypothesis with greater rigour. 
 It is possible that the preponderance of null findings conceals an 
underlying nonlinear relationship, such as a negative quadratic one in which 
nonreligious individuals fear death more as their religious beliefs (such as 
they are) increase, while religious individuals show the opposite pattern. 
Unfortunately, as noted above, only eight of the 100 studies we included in 
our meta-analysis tested for nonlinear effects. A further three were found in 
the larger initial set of 125. Of these 11, 10 provided some evidence for a 
curvilinear relationship, and only one found no such association.  
 Nelson (1974) provides perhaps the earliest direct evidence of a 
curvilinear relationship. The sample, though, impressively large (N = 1,279) 
was, unfortunately, only of men who self-identified as Christian. The study 
found that death anxiety was lowest among individuals who attended church 
least (“never”) or scored lowest on measures of private religious devotion, 
experience, and belief, as well as those who attended church most (“at least 
weekly”) or scored highest on other dimensions of religiosity; conversely, 
death anxiety was highest among those who only went to church 
“occasionally, but less often than monthly” or had low-to-moderate scores on 
other religiosity dimensions (e.g., private religious devotion). Individuals 
who were moderately religious (e.g., attending church monthly or more) were 
more similar to those who were devoutly religious than those who were 
moderately irreligious. Nelson reported regression analyses that provided 
evidence both for a linear positive correlation between death anxiety and these 
different aspects of religiosity (driven, it appears, by the steep increase 
between the very irreligious and the slightly religious), as well as the 
predicted inverted-U quadratic pattern.    
 Similarly, Leming (1980; N = 372) measured different aspects of 
religiosity—religious belief, religious ritual participation, and religious 
experience—to examine relationships with death anxiety, which he measured 
using his own Leming Death Fear scale. This he treated as a unidimensional 
measure, even though it contains items pertaining to various aspects of death 
anxiety. In contrast to Nelson’s (1974) study, Leming (1980) found a negative 
relationship between death anxiety and religiosity, for all three aspects of 
religiosity he studied. However, a close inspection of Leming’s data suggests 
that death anxiety initially rises with religiosity when religiosity levels are 
low. For the moderately to strongly religious individuals, however, death 
anxiety declines. Leming’s (1980) own interpretation of this finding is that 
religion both causes and alleviates the fear of death; it causes anxiety by 
introducing ideas about post-mortem judgment and the possibility of divine 
punishment, and only alleviates it when believers are sufficiently committed, 
aware of their commitment, and concomitantly confident of their salvation. 
 McMordie (1981; N = 320) had participants self-classify their degree of 
religiosity, as “extremely religious”, “very religious”, “somewhat religious”, 
“slightly religious”, “not at all religious”, or “anti-religious”. As might be 
expected, only a handful of individuals considered themselves either 
extremely religious (n = 9) or anti-religious (n = 14), whereas most people 
either identified as somewhat (n = 123) or slightly (n = 86) religious. Using a 
modified version of Templer’s Death Anxiety Scale, he found an inverted-U 
curve: those who were “slightly” and “somewhat” religious reported the 
highest levels of death anxiety, whereas the “extremely religious” and “anti-
religious” reported the lowest levels of death anxiety. This pattern of results is 
slightly different from either Leming’s (1980) or Nelson’s (1974) in that there 
is no evidence of a linear relationship, either positive or negative. McMordie’s 
interpretation of these findings also differs: he posits that it is the strength of 
one’s conviction—independent of the content of the belief system—that 
reduces death anxiety. In other words, McMordie (1981) represents a 
precursor to the worldview defense account of terror management.  
 Downey (1984) studied 237 middle-aged men, using Boyar’s Fear of 
Death Scale and her own composite measure of religiosity that included 
elements of religious belief, behaviour, experience, and the perceived effects 
of religiosity; six of the 13 items in the scale pertained to religious beliefs. She 
found no evidence of a linear relationship but, dividing her sample into low, 
moderate, and high religiosity groups—she found an inverted-U relationship 
between death anxiety and religiosity: as before, the moderate religiosity 
group reported higher levels of death anxiety than did the other two groups. 
She too concluded that “strength of religious commitment is the most 
significant variable in explaining the relationship between religion and fear of 
death” (p. 820). 
 Aday’s (1985) study of 181 college students focused on afterlife belief, 
but also measured frequency of church attendance, and intensity or strength 
of religious belief. He reported a weak negative correlation between afterlife 
belief (Osarchuk & Tatz, 1973) and death anxiety (Templer, 1970), but did not 
attempt to test for nonlinear effects. He does, however, note that individuals 
who only went to church monthly reported higher levels of death anxiety 
than did individuals who went weekly or seldom. A similar pattern holds for 
the measure of participants’ intensity of religious belief. Aday provided no 
substantive theoretical interpretation of these findings. 
 Wink and Scott (2005; N = 155) ran a study on older participants (in 
their 60s and 70s), and found no linear relationship between participants’ 
religiosity (including both belief and behaviour components) and their fear of 
death or fear of dying; however, they did find an inverted-U relationship 
between religiosity and fear of death (but not fear of dying). Wink and Scott 
(2005) also provided evidence for the view that consistency between belief and 
behaviour is important in reducing death anxiety: participants who held 
positive views of the afterlife but scored low on other measures of religiosity 
(e.g., behaviour, belief) reported the highest levels of death anxiety. Wink and 
Scott (2005) tie these findings directly to those were reviewed above about the 
divergence between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity, arguing that extrinsic 
religiosity does not mitigate death anxiety because it involves an 
inconsistency between (true) belief and (superficial) participation. 
 A recent study complicates Wink and Scott’s (2005) interpretation 
somewhat. Wen (2012; N = 236) used Hoge’s Intrinsic Religious Motivation 
scale, and treated intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity as two ends of a 
continuum. In this study, as in many other studies included in our meta-
analysis, extrinsic religiosity was positively correlated with death anxiety; 
however, there was also a curvilinear trend, such that both highly intrinsically 
and highly extrinsically motivated religious individuals reported lower levels 
of death anxiety than did individuals whose religious orientations were less 
clearly defined. This finding is inconsistent with Wink and Scott’s (2005) idea 
that death anxiety should be correlated with intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity 
in opposite directions: in this case, lower death anxiety is associated with both 
high levels of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. Perhaps then, even extrinsic 
religiosity has its benefits, at least for people who are solidly of that 
disposition. Insofar as this finding challenges the “good-religion-versus-bad-
religion” view of religious orientation that Wink and Scott (2005) adopt, it 
also challenges the relevance of these constructs for our theoretical purposes. 
Fortunately, in addition to religious orientation, Wen’s study also 
investigated frequency of religious attendance and strength of religious belief. 
In the former case, high religious attendance was associated with low death 
anxiety, but there was also a curvilinear relationship consistent with other 
studies just described. However, death anxiety and strength of religious 
belief—measured via a single question, “How strong is your religious 
belief?”—were conspicuously unassociated.  
 Wen’s (2012) null findings with respect to strength of religious belief 
are in contrast with work by Jong et al. (2013; N = 213). In this study, a 
deliberate effort was made to obtain a sample with an approximately equally 
split between religious and nonreligious individuals. When collapsing across 
religious and nonreligious participants, no linear association between death 
anxiety and religious belief was found. However, splitting the sample into 
religious (n = 66) and nonreligious (n = 81) subsamples, revealed a clear 
difference: the correlation between death anxiety and religious belief was 
positive for individuals who identified as nonreligious (including atheists and 
agnostics), and negative for those who identified as religious.    
 Of the eleven studies that tested the curvilinearity hypotheses, these 
eight provide consistent support for an inverted-U relationship between 
religiosity and death anxiety, across diverse measures of religiosity (e.g., 
belief, service attendance)7. Two others provide more qualified support. First, 
Power and Smith (2008), who analyzed self-reported religiosity (“not at all 
religious” to “very religious”) found only “a potential curvilinear effect” on 
two subscales out of Hoelter’s MOFDS’s eight, namely “fear of the unknown” 
and “fear of conscious death”. As alluded to earlier, it is “fear of the 
unknown” that is most relevant to our interests: so, even though the other 
subscales revealed no such pattern, Power and Smith (2008) seems to have 
found some, albeit weak, support for a curvilinear relationship on the most 
relevant construct.  
 The second study that provided only qualified support for the 
curvilinear hypothesis is by Ellis, Wahab, and Ratsaningan (2013). They 
collected data in Malaysia (n = 2396), the United States (n = 1291), and Turkey 
(n = 265), which allowed them to make both cross-cultural and interreligious 
comparisons. They found that individuals who self-identified as nonreligious 
reported the lowest levels of death anxiety, Muslims reported the highest, and 
Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists sat somewhere in between. In contrast to 
the aggregate effects we found in our meta-analyses, they also found positive 
linear relationships, between death anxiety and various other single-item 
                                                
7 Furthermore, consistent with our systematic review, the findings regarding linear 
effects were heterogeneous, and the most common result was no significant 
association (see Supplementary Material).  
measures of religiosity, including measures of belief in God, belief in an 
afterlife, and religious observance. They also reported curve estimations for 
each of their single-item measures, separately for each country. Although they 
did find evidence of curvilinearity—on most measures in each country, 
negative quadratic functions fit the data—the linear effects were generally 
stronger than the quadratic ones, at least in Malaysia and Turkey. In the 
United States, however, the quadratic patterns were much more evident, and 
the curvilinear relationships were stronger than the linear ones. Thus, while 
Ellis et al.’s (2013) findings do not contradict the curvilinearity hypothesis, 
they do alert us to the potential cultural contingency of patterns. Indeed, even 
comparing Malaysia and Turkey, both of which are majority Muslim 
countries (approximately 60% in Malaysia, over 90% in Turkey), the patterns 
of correlations display some interesting differences; for example, the beliefs in 
God and immortality linearly predict death anxiety in Malaysia, but not in 
Turkey.   
 Indeed, among those testing nonlinear effects, the only study to not 
find an inverted-U pattern, is Feifel and Nagy (1981; N = 616). They found no 
curvilinear relationship between Collett-Lester’s fear of death subscale and 
Hoge’s intrinsic religiosity measure. However, it is not clear how 
generalizable these findings are: Feifel and Nagy’s (1981) sample consisted of 
alcoholics (n = 123), drug addicts (n = 115), inmates (n = 92), deputy sheriffs (n 
= 143), and only 143 members of the general public. Furthermore, as Feifel 
and Nagy (1981) did not to test for nonlinear effects using other measures of 
religiosity (e.g., belief, behaviour), their results do not provide strong 
disconfirmation of the hypothesis.  
 Although our meta-analyses did not provide direct evidence for the 
curvilinearity hypothesis, and only weak indirect evidence in the form of 
small negative correlations, a closer examination of the 11 studies that 
deliberately tested a curvilinear relationship is suggestive. Of these 11, eight 
provided firm support for the curvilinearity hypothesis; two studies provided 
some support, and one study provided disconfirmatory evidence. 
Furthermore, Ellis et al.’s (2013) three-nation analyses raise questions about 
the cultural contingency of the relationship between death anxiety and 
religiosity that future research should explore. 
 An important limitation of our meta-analysis was that statistics 
reported in papers tended to be reported in a manner that made it difficult to 
rigorously evaluate evidence for the curvilinearity hypothesis. In particular, 
in only one study (Jong et al., 2013) were participants divided into a 
nonreligious sample and a religious sample before analysis. Given that the 
curvilinearity hypothesis makes different predictions for these subgroups, the 
aggregate effect will tend to get swamped be the subgroup that dominates 
numerically. This is of particular concern because, as we have seen, the 
majority of the published studies included very few nonreligious participants 
in their sample. Future research could address this issue by taking an 
individual participant approach to meta-analysis, which would involve 
requesting data from the authors of studies to divide analyses into religious 
and nonreligious subgroups. Such an analysis could play a crucial role in 
testing the curvilinear hypothesis more rigorously.   
  
Conclusion 
There is no shortage of empirical research examining relationships between 
trait levels of death anxiety and religiosity. There is, however, little consensus 
about the relationship; studies have reported negative, positive, and null 
linear effects, and our estimates confirmed these high levels of heterogeneity. 
Although our meta-analyses indicated weak negative correlations between 
most aspects of religiosity and death anxiety (extrinsic religious orientation 
being a notable exception), the aggregated effect sizes were very small. Given 
the sampling biases—most of the studies were on predominantly religious 
participants—these negative correlations could be taken as indirect evidence 
for the curvilinearity hypothesis: they represent the right-hand side of the 
inverted-U curve. Furthermore, only 11 studies reported testing for 
curvilinear relationships, and of these, 10 provided some support for an 
inverted-U relationship. It is possible that other studies could have found 
similar results had they tested for a negative quadratic relationship, but we 
have no direct evidence for this.  
  Thanatocentric theories of religion generally predict an inverted-U 
relationship between death anxiety and religiosity, such that death anxiety is 
lowest among very nonreligious (e.g., atheists) and very religious individuals, 
and highest among their less certain counterparts. Our systematic review and 
meta-analyses provide some evidence for such a pattern, but our conclusions 
require some qualification. First, aggregate effect sizes were very small; if 
there is a curvilinear relationship between death anxiety and religiosity, it is a 
weak one. Furthermore, there was little evidence that the proportion of 
religious/nonreligious participants in the samples affected the outcome of the 
meta-analyses. Nor did examining different aspects of religiosity separately 
make much of a difference, though the distinction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic religious orientation once again proved important (see also Cohen et 
al., 2005). The cause of the high heterogeneity across effect sizes has yet to be 
identified, and this renders interpretation difficult. This should therefore be a 
priority in future research. Finally, although 10 out of 11 of the studies that 
deliberately tested the curvilinearity provided some support for it, there was 
also some evidence of cross-cultural and/or interreligious variation. More 
cross-cultural data are required before we can make general claims about the 
relationship between death anxiety and religion.  
 Although various thanatocentric theories of religion predict the same 
inverted-U pattern, they have different causal explanations. It is possible, for 
example, that religiosity increases with death anxiety until the individual in 
question believes, at which point her religiosity decreases her death anxiety 
(Jong et al., 2013). It is also possible, however, as the worldview defense 
account of Terror Management Theory says, that baseline levels of death 
anxiety are high, but that strong religious or nonreligious commitments both 
decrease death anxiety (e.g., Landau, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2004). It is also 
possible that religiosity increases death anxiety—for example, by raising the 
possibility of divine wrath and postmortem punishment—at low levels, but 
decreases it at high levels, when individuals are more certain of their 
salvation (Homans, 1941). Correlational evidence cannot resolve these 
theoretical disputes, as there are disagreements about causal processes. 
Rather, what is needed next is an experimental approach to testing 
thanatocentric theories of religion. 
  
Abdel-Khalek, A. M. (1998). The structure and measurement of death 
obsession. Personality and Individual Differences, 24, 159–165. 
Abdel-Khalek, A. M. (2002). Death, anxiety, and depression: a comparison 
between Egyptian, Kuwaiti, and Lebanese undergraduates. Omega, 45, 
277–287. 
Aday, R. H. (1985). Belief in afterlife and death anxiety: correlates and 
comparisons. Omega, 15, 67–75 
Allport, G. W. (1950). The individual and his religion. New York, NY: McMillan. 
Allport, G. W., & Ross, J. M. (1967). Personal religious orientation and 
prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5, 432–443. 
Becker, E. (1973). The denial of death. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Card, N. A. (2011). Applied meta-analysis for social science research. New York, 
NY: Guilford Press. 
Carroll, M. P. (2010). Psychoanalytic theories of religion and the “Catholic 
problem”. In B. Beit-Hallahmi (ed.), Psychoanalysis and theism: critical 
reflections on the Grünbaum thesis (pp. 81–98). Lanham, MD: Jason 
Aronson.   
Cicirelli, V. G. (2002). Fear of death in older adults: Predictions from terror 
management theory. Journal of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences, 57B, 
P358–P366.  
Cochran, W. (1954). The combination of estimates from different experiments. 
Biometrics, 10, 101–129.  
Cohen, A. B., Pierce, J. D., Chambers, J., Meade, R., Gorvine, B. J., & Koenig, 
H. G. (2005). Intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity, belief in the afterlife, 
death anxiety, and life satisfaction in young Catholics and Protestants. 
Journal of Research in Personality, 39, 307–324. 
Collett, L. J., & Lester, D. (1969). The fear of death and the fear of dying. 
Journal of Psychology, 72, 179–181. 
Conte, H. R., Weiner. M. B., & Plutchik, R. (1982). Measuring death anxiety: 
conceptual, psychometric, and factor–analytic aspects. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 775–785. 
Dechesne, M., Pyszczynski, T., Arndt, J., Ransom, S., Sheldon, K. M, van 
Knippenberg, A., & Janssen, J. (2003). Literal and symbolic immortality: 
the effect of evidence of literal immortality on self–esteem striving in 
response to mortality salience. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
84, 722–737. 
Donahue, M. J. (1985). Intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness: The empirical 
research. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 24, 418–423. 
Donovan, J. M. (1994). Defining religion: death and anxiety in an Afro–
Brazilian cult. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. New Orleans: Tulane 
University. 
Downey, A. M. (1984). Relationship of religiosity to death anxiety of middle–
aged males. Psychological Reports, 54, 811–822. 
Durlak, J. A. (1982). Using the Templer scale to assess “death anxiety”: a 
cautionary note. Psychological Reports, 50, 1257–1258. 
Ellis, L., & Wahab, E. A. (2013). Religiosity and fear of death: a theory–
oriented review of the empirical literature. Review of Religious Research, 
55, 149–189. 
Ellis, L., Wahab, E. A., & Ratnasingan, M. (2013). Religiosity and fear of death: 
a three-nation comparison. Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 16, 179–199. 
Feifel, H., & Nagy, V. T. (1981). Another look at fear of death. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 49, 278–286. 
Florian, V., & Kravetz, S. (1983). Fear of personal death: attribution, structure 
and relation to religious belief. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
44, 600–607.  
Gilliland, J. C., & Templer, D. I. (1985). Relationship of death anxiety scale 
factors to subjective states. Omega, 16, 155–167. 
Gorsuch, R. L. (1984). Measurement: the boon and bane of investigating 
religion. American Psychologist, 39, 228–236.  
Greenberg, J., T. Pyszczynski and S. Solomon. (1986). The causes and 
consequences of a need for self–esteem: a terror management theory. In 
R. F. Baumeister (ed.) Public self and private self (pp. 189–212). New York, 
NY: Springer–Verlag.  
Hall, D. L., Matz, D. C., & Wood, W. (2010). Why don’t we practice what we 
preach? A meta–analytic review of religious racism. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 14, 126–139. 
Harmon–Jones, E., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Simon, L. (1996). The effects 
of mortality salience on intergroup bias between minimal groups. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 26, 677–681. 
Hedges, L. V., & Olkin, I. (1985). Statistical methods for meta-analysis. San Diego, 
CA: Academic Press. 
Heflick, N. A., & Goldenberg, J. L. (2012). No atheists in foxholes: Arguments 
for (but not against) afterlife belief buffers mortality salience effects for 
atheists. British Journal of Social Psychology, 51, 385–392. 
Higgins, J. P. T., Thompson, S. G., Deeks, J. J., & Altman, D. G. (2003). 
Measuring inconsistency in meta-analysis. British Medical Journal, 327, 
557–560.  
Hoelter, J. W. (1979). Multidimensional treatment of fear of death. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 47, 996–999.  
Homans, G. C. (1941). Anxiety and ritual: The theories of Malinowski and 
Radcliffe–Brown. American Anthropologist, 43, 164–172. 
Hooper, T., & Spilka, B. (1970). Some meanings and correlates of future time 
and death among college students. Omega, 1, 49–56. 
Huedo-Medina, T. B., Sanchez-Meca, J., Marin-Martinez, F., & Botella, J. 
(2006). Assessing heterogeneity in meta-analysis: Q statistic or I2 index? 
Psychological Methods, 11, 193–206.  
Hume, D. (2008). The natural history of religion. J. C. A. Gaskin, (ed.), Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1757). 
IntHout, J., Ioannidis, J., & Borm, G. F. (2014). The Hartung-Knapp-Sidik-
Jonkman method for random effects meta-analysis is straightforward 
and considerably outperforms the standard DerSimonian-Laird method. 
BMC Medical Research Methodology, 14, 1471-2288.  
Jong, J., Bluemke, M., & Halberstadt, J. (2013). Fear of death and supernatural 
beliefs: developing a new Supernatural Belief Scale to test the 
relationship. European Journal of Personality, 27, 495–506. 
Kirkpatrick, L. A., & Hood Jr, R. W. (1990). Intrinsic–extrinsic religious 
orientation: The boon or bane of contemporary psychology of religion? 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 29, 442–462. 
Koenig, H. G., George, L. K., & Peterson, B. L. (1998). Religiosity and 
remission of depression in medically ill older patients. American Journal 
of Psychiatry, 155, 536–542. 
Landau, M. J., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S. (2004). The motivational 
underpinnings of religion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27, 743–744. 
Leming, M. R. (1980). Religion and death: a test of Homans’ thesis. Omega, 10, 
347–364. 
Lester, D. (1990). The Collett–Lester Fear of Death Scale: The original version 
and a revision. Death Studies, 14, 451–468. 
Levin, R. (1990). A re–examination of the dimensionality of death anxiety. 
Omega, 20, 314–349. 
Lonetto, R., Fleming, S., & Mercer, G. W. (1979). The structure of death 
anxiety: a factor analytic study. Journal of Personality Assessment, 43, 388–
392. 
Malinowski, B. (1948). Magic, science and religion and other essays. Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press. 
Martin, T. O. (1982). Death anxiety and social desirability among nurses. 
Omega, 13, 51–58.  
McMordie, W. R. (1981). Religiosity and fear of death: Strength of belief 
system. Psychological Reports, 49, 921–922. 
Nelson, L. D. (1974). Functions and dimensions of religion. Sociological 
Analysis, 263–272. 
Norenzayan, A., & Hansen, I. G. (2006). Belief in supernatural agents in the 
face of death. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 174–187. 
Osarchuk, M., & Tatz, S. J. (1973). Effect of induced fear of death on belief in 
afterlife. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27, 256–260.  
Radcliffe–Brown, A. R. (1939). Taboo. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Rosenthal, R., Rosnow, R. L., & Rubin, D. B. (2000). Contrasts and effect sizes in 
behavioral research: A correlational approach. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Royal, K. D., & Elahi, F. (2011). Psychometric properties of the death anxiety 
scale (DAS) among terminally ill cancer patients. Journal of Psychosocial 
Oncology, 29, 359–371. 
Ryan, R. M., Rigby, S., & King, K. (1993). Two types of religious 
internalization and their relations to religious orientations and mental 
health. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 586–596 
Sedikides, C., & Gebauer, J. E. (2010). Religiosity as self-enhancement: a meta-
analysis of the relation between socially desirable responding and 
religiosity. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14, 17–36. 
Sterne, J. A., Sutton, A. J., Ioannidis, J. P., Terrin, N., Jones, D. R., Lau, J., . . . 
Higgins, J. P. (2011). Recommendations for examining and interpreting 
funnel plot asymmetry in meta-analyses of randomised controlled trials. 
British Medical Journal, 343; d4002. 
Team, R. C. (2013). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R 
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. URL 
http://www.R-project.org/.  
Templer, D. I., Awadalla, A., Al-Fayez, G., Frazee, J., Bassman, L., Connelly, 
H. J., Arikawa, H., Abdel–Khalek, A. M. (2006). Construction of a death 
anxiety scale–extended. Omega, 53, 209–226. 
Templer, D. I., Lavoie, M., Chalgujian, H., & Thomas-Dobson, S. (1990). The 
measurement of death depression. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 46, 834–
839. 
Terrin, N., Schmid, C. H., & Lau, J. (2005). In an empirical evaluation of the 
funnel plot, researchers could not visually identify publication bias. 
Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 58, 894–901.  
Thorson, J. A., & Powell, F. C. (1992). A revised Death Anxiety Scale. Death 
Studies, 16, 507–521. 
Tomás-Sábado, J., & Gómez-Benito, J. (2002). Psychometric properties of the 
Spanish form of Templer’s death anxiety scale. Psychological Reports, 91, 
1116–1120. 
Vail III, K. E., Arndt, J., Abdollahi, A. (2012). Exploring the existential function 
of religion and supernatural agent beliefs among Christians, Muslims, 
atheists, and agnostics. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 
1288–1300.  
Vail III, K. E., Rothschild, Z. K., Weise, D. R., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & 
Greenberg, J. (2010). A terror management analysis of the psychological 
functions of religion.  Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14, 84–94. 
Ventis, W. L. (1995). The relationships between religion and mental health. 
Journal of Social Issues, 51, 33–48. 
Viechtbauer, W. (2010). Conducting meta-analysis in R with the metafor 
package. Journal of Statistical Software, 36, 1–48.  
Wallace, B. C., Dahabreh, I. J., Trikalinos, T. A., Lau, J., Trow, P., & Schmid, C. 
H. (2012). Closing the gap between methodologists and end-users: R as a 
computational back-end. Journal of Statistical Software, 49, 1–15.  
Wen, Y. H. (2012). Religiosity and death anxiety of college students. The 
Journal of Human Resource and Adult Learning, 8, 98–106. 
Wink, P., & Scott, J. (2005). Does religiousness buffer against the fear of death 
and dying in late adulthood? Findings from a longitudinal study. Journal 
of Gerontology 60B, 4, 207–214. 
Wittkowski, J. (2001). The construction of the multidimensional orientation 
toward dying and death inventory (MODDI–F). Death Studies, 25, 479–
495. 
 
 
